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Abstract
This paper presents a knowledge-based learningmethod and reports on case stud
ies in different domains. The method integrates abduction and learning. Abduction
provides an improved method for constructing explanations, in comparison with de
ductive methods traditionally associated with explanation-based learning. The im
provement enlarges the set of examples that can be explained so that one can leam
from additional examples using explanation-based macro-learning techniques. Ab
duction also provides a form of knowledge level learning. The importance of ab-
ductive learning is shown by case studies involving over a hundred examples taken
from diverse domains requiring logical, physical, and psychological knowledge and
reasoning. The case studies are relevant to a wide range of practical tasks including;
natural language understanding and plan recognition; qualitative physical reasoning
and postdiction; diagnosis and signal interpretation; and decision-making imder un
certainty. The descriptions of the case studies showhow to set up abduction engines
in particular domains and how abduction solves particular tasks. They show how to
provide and how to represent the relevant knowledge, including both domain knowl
edge and meta-knowledge relevant to abduction and search control. The description
of each case study includes an example, its explanation, and discussions of what is
learned by macro-learning and by abductive inference.
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1 Introduction
This paper presents an abductive form of explanation-based learning. In this introductory
section, we provide some background information on abduction and on the role of inference
in learmng. In the next section, we provide a description of our learning method and an
illustration in terms ofa concrete example. Ourgoal in doing this is to provide a description
sufficiently detailed to enable readers to implement and use the method. In the subsequent
section, we describe case studies applying this method in four different domains. One goal
of the case studies section is to show how the method has been applied in sufficient detail
to enable the reader to apply the method in new domains. Another goal is to draw general
lessons from the case studies. Next, we discuss related work, limitations of the present
work, and suggestions for future work. The final section smnmarizes the paper and draws
conclusions.
1.1 Inference and Learning
Most machine learning methods involve some form of induction or inference from spe
cific to general statements; consequently they are often called "data-driven," "empirical,"
or "similarity-based" learning methods (see, e.g., Michalski &; Chilausky, 1980; Quinlan,
1986). Recently, attentionhas been given to a complementary class of "knowledge-driven,"
"analytical," or "explanation-based" (EBL) learning methods (see e.g., DeJong&: Mooney,
1986; Mitchell, Keller, & Kedar-Cabelli, 1986) but these methods have been characterized
in terms of deduction. There is a third form of inference called abduction. We argue in
this paper that abductive inference is at least as fundamental and important for learning
as inductive and deductive inference.
Intuitively, EBL is "learning based upon explanations," so EBL theories and systems
include components aimed at describing or implementing processes for constructing expla
nations. Formalizations and implementations ofEBLcan be improved upon by introdudng
more sophisticatedmodels of the explanation process. We argue that an important step in
this direction is to view explanation as a kind of plausible inference process — one that is
not often deductive. The particular form of plausible explanatory inference explored here
is based upon Peirce's notion of abduction.
1.2 Abductive Inference
Charles Sanders Peirce (Peirce, 1931-1958) used the term abduction as a name for a
particular form of explanatory hypothesis generation. His description was basically:
The surprising fact C is observed;
But if A were true, C would be a matter of course,
hence there is reason to suspect that A is true.
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In other words, if there is a causal or logical reason Afor C, and Cis observed, then one
might conjecture that Ais true in an effort to explain C.
Since Peirce s original formulation, many variants of this form of reasoning have also
come to be referred to as abduction. We focus on a logical view of abduction advocated
by Poole (e.g., Poole, Goebel, &Aleliunas, 1987).^ In this approach, observations Oare
explained given some background knowledge expressed as a logical theory T by finding
some hypotheses H such that
FAThO.
In other words, if the hypotheses are assumed, the observation follows by way of general
laws and other facts given as background knowledge. Consistency is also desirable so it is
usually required that
H f\T \f false.
2 Abduction and Learning
In the influential model of EBL presented by Mitchell et al (1986) and in implementations
such as (Kedar-Cabelli Sc McCarty, 1987), learning is based upon explanations generated
by adeductive theorem prover. The learning method is essentially aform of lemma car-hing
or deductive macro-learning.
This form of EBL has been criticized on the grounds that itonly improves efficiency and
does not involve "learning at the knowledge-level" (as defined by Dietterich, 1986). The
deductive closure of the knowledge-base does not change as a result of learning because the
macro-learmng method specializes existing general knowledge, even though it generalizes
given examples.
This early model of EBL rests on a purely deductive model of explanation. Integrating
more sophisticated models of the explanation process with learning leads to interesting
new models of EBL with additional learning capabilities.
2.1 Abductive Macro Learning
We present an integration of abduction and learning that combines afirst order logical form
of abduction with macro-learmng. The abduction component is based on an early approach
to medianizing abduction described in (Pople, 1973). The method is implemented in a
PROLOG metarinterpreter called AMAL (Abductive MAcro Learner).'^
^See also (Levesque, 1989).
^PROLOG was chosen because the basic operation involved in constructing explanations, abductive
inference, is similar to backward chaining. PROLOG provides basic operations such as unification that
are an essential part of backward chaining.
Case Facts
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General Laws
Assumability Criteria
Operationality Criteria
'Explaixations^
Assumptions 1
Macros
ABDUCTION
ENGINE
Figure 1: Inputs and Outputs of the Abduction Engine
An input/output characterization of the program is given in Figure 1. AMAL takes
as input a collection of PROLOG clauses encoding theories. One theory represents back
ground knowledge, another captures the facts of the case at hand. An observation to be
explained is given as a query.
AMAL is also given an operationality criterion and an assumability criterion. The
operationality criterion is used to flag queries that should be turned over to the underly
ing PROLOG interpreter. The intuition is that AMAL performs explanatory reasoning,
whereas the PROLOG interpreter performs lower-level reasoning in a more eflScient man
ner, without keeping track of explanatory relationships. Separate theories are provided:
explanatory clauses are used to construct explanations, while ordinary PROLOG clauses
are used for operational computations.
The assumability criterion determines whether a query that could not be proved or
disproved may be assumed. The query may or may not be operational.^ In general, the
assumability criterion is used to reject inadmissible hypotheses and to assume admissible
hypotheses. The user provides characterizations of admissible and inadmissible hypothesis
as part of the domain description but in some domains in questionable cases the user is
asked whether a specific hypothesis should be assmned.
AMAL's output includes an explanation of the given observation. The explanation
can include assumptions made in order to complete the explanation. These assumptions,
plus a macro learned by traditional explanation-based maCTO ieaming, are added to the
knowledge base for use on subsequent examples.
A description of the procedure followed by the abduction engine is shown in Table 1.
The abduction engine attempts to construct explanations of given observations using gen
eral laws and specific facts. In the implementation, explanations are proofs represented as
AND trees. Observations to be explained correspond to conclusions of the proofs (roots
of the trees). General laws are encoded as rules and these are used to generate the proofs
through a process based upon backward chaining.
The mechanization of abduction is comprised of three steps (Table 1). The first step
^Inmostcases, assumptions involving operational hypotheses aredisallowed. However in some domains
they are allowed (see Section 3.1).
Table 1: A Procedural Sketch of the Abduction Engine
Given: a first-in-first-out queue of queries Q containing observations to be explained;
Find: explanations for the queries, using abductive inferences.
1. BACKWARD CHAINING:
While the query list Q is not empty, do:
(a) Select the first query q and remove it from Q.
(b) If 9 is operational then compute an answer directly if possible, else
(c) If q is an admissible goal and is indirectly explainable using a rule,
then use the rule to generate new queries and add them to Q, else
If 9 is an admissible hypothesis
then add q to the list U of unexplained queries,
else fail and backtrack.
2. IDENTIFICATION:
While there are unifiable pairs of queries in U, unify and replace pairs.
3. ASSUMPTION;
While there are unexplained queries in U,
(a) Select the first query u and remove it from U.
(b) If the truth of u is not known, and it is an admissible hypothesis, and it is ratified by
the user (optional), then assume u, else fail and backtrack.
corresponds to backward chaining as it is implemented in PROLOG interpreters. The
observation is treated as a query. Initially, there is only one query but in general, there
may be a number of open questions in the query list Q. The search process attempts to
ground the explanation tree in known facts. If a query is operational, AMAL attempts
to identify it with a fact in the data-base or in its deductive closure. In attempting to
prove operational queries, AMAL does not keep track of an explanation and it does not
use "explanatory" clauses. However, it does allow for the possibility that a query may be
operational and/or provable in several ways. If one operationalization of the query fails to
pan out, backtracking is used to search for another.If the query is not operational, or no
direct operational explanation is possible, then explanatory rules may be used to extend
the partial explanation, replacing existing queries with new queries. Before queries are
allowed to generate new queries in this manner, a domain-dependent test is applied so that
goals deemed inadmissible are disallowed. This is an important form of search control (see
Section 3.3). A similar domain-dependent test is applied to reject inadmissible hypotheses
among the remaining queries.
The second step begins when backward chaining fails. In this step, the remaining
unexplained queries are examined and some of them are assumed to be "the same." Unlike
the previous step, this inference isnot deductively sound, but errors arerecoverable through
backtracking. In terms of Table 1, at the beginning of this stage Q is the empty list, C/ is a
non-nil list of unexplained statements, and the explanation is incomplete. The algorithm
continues by first selecting an arbitrary unexplained statement u from U. If u can be
identified (unified) with any other statement in U, then the pair is replaced in U with
their identification. The identification step ends when no more queries in U are pairwise
identifiable.
This "identification" or "merging" step is based on the synthesis operator advocated
by Pople (1973) and justified in terms of Occam's razor. Thisoperation simplifies explana
tions, reduces the numberof assumptions that must be made, and increases the plaiaibility
of the explanation. Another advantage is that identification assumptions often introduce
new information. The identification of two previously unrelated statements in different
parts of an explanation often causes sharing of information between the separate branches
of the explanation. In the implementation, statements are identified by unifying two well-
formed-formulae. This can cause variables in both formulae to take on new bindings.
The new bindings then propagate to other statements that share the same variables. See
Section 2.2 for an example of this sort of information sharing.
The third abduction step tests whether remaining queries can be assumed. The queries
are tested to ensure that they are not known to be true or false. Non-explanatory theorem
^The notion ofoperationality used here isrelatively flexible; it takes advantage ofanunderlying theorem
prover capable of reasoning about operationa^ty. See Hirsh (1987) for a discussion of the importance of
this feature.
Table 2: Background Knowledge for Pople's Liver Diagnosis Example
inflammatory(abscess).
locatedJn(liver, right-upper-quadrant).
chills <— present(P,S), inflammatory(P).
pain(R) *- present(P,S), locatetLin(S,R).
poples-syndrome(R) ♦— chills, pain(R).
proving is allowed in testing whether a hypothesis is known to be true. AMAL calls
PROLOG and if the hypothesis is proven true then it is not allowed as an assumption. A
test against stored negative assertions is used to determine whether a hypothesis is false
(we do not use negation as failure). This test is a limited form of the consistency check
called for in the formal specification of abduction (see Section 1.2). Together, these two
tests ensure that a hypothesis is not known to be true or false. Next, an "assumabifity"
test is used to decide whether to assume that a hypothesis is true. The test includes a
domain-independent component and a hook that takes advantage of domain-dependent
information about admissible hypotheses. A human user may also be consulted in some
domains. This test is applied to each of the queries u in list U. If n is not assumable, then
the current attempt to find an explanation is aborted and backtracking is invoked in order
to continue the search for acceptable explanations.
2.2 An Example: Liver Diagnosis
An example adapted from Pople (1973) serves to illustrate the method. Suppose the
task is to do diagnosis by explaining observed symptoms in terms of imderlying disease(s).
Suppose that the general statements shown in Table 2 are given. The rules state that
chills may be caused by the presence of an inflammation in some region of the body.
Furthermore, pain in a region may be caused by the presence of a problem in a structure
in that region. The facts state that the liver is in the right upper quadrant and abscesses
are inflammatory.®
Given an observation encoding the symptoms chills and pain in the right upper quad
rant, the abduction system attempts to explain these symptoms by backward chaining on
the given rules, attempting to ground out in known facts. Table 3 shows a partial explana
tion. At this point, the chills are explained as the result of an inflammatory abscess while
^Some of these facts (e.g., that abscesses are inflammatory) might be better stated as universally
quantified implications (e.g., 'iX,inflammatary{X) *— abace3a{X)). We follow the original formulation
in order to keep the example as simple as possible.
Table 3: A Partial Explanation for Pople's Liver Diagnosis Example
poples_syndrome(right_upper_quadrant)
chills
present(abscess, _73)
inflammatory(abscess
pain(right-upper-quadrant)
Ipresent(-232, liver)
locatedJn(liver, right_upper_quadrant)
the pain in the right upper quadrant is explained by the presence of a problem in the liver.
The fact that abscesses are inflammatory contributes to the explanation of chills while the
fact that the liver is in the right upper quadrant contributes to the explanation of pain
in the right upper quadrant. This explanation is incomplete: Two questions remain — is
something present in the liver? and is there an inflammatory abscess present somewhere
in the body? These questions cannot be answered using only the given facts. This is in
dicated by the presence of boxes and variables in the table. The boxes indicate queries,
open questions, or gaps in the explanation. They identify hypotheses that, if assumed,
would complete the explanation. Variables in the explanation correspond to imidentifled
objects. They are existentially quantified. In this case, the hypotheses state that there is
something in the liver and there is an inflammatory abscess somewhere in the body.
An explanation-based learning system based exclusively on deduction (Hirsh, 1987;
Kedar-Cabelli &: McCarty, 1987; Prieditis &: Mostow, 1987) will fail to explain, generalize,
and leam from this example because there is no proof of chills and pain from the known
facts. AMAL does not fail. Instead, it completes the explanation by going beyond de
duction in two ways: (1) it identifies the presence of an abscess in some bodily structure
with the presence of something in the liver; and (2) it assumes that there is indeed an
inflammatory abscess in the liver. The result of abduction in this case is that the patient's
observed chills and the pain in his right upper quadrant are explained by an inflammatory
abscess in his liver.
The "merge" step in the abduction procedure identifies the two boxed hypotheses shown
in Table 3. In other words, the assumption is made that these two queries or hypotheses are
identical, and they are merged using imification. Prior to merging, in the first hypothesis,
the object present is known (an inflammatory abscess) but its location is unknown. In the
second hypothesis, the location is known (the liver) while the object is unknown. When
the hypotheses are unified, they share information. After merging, all variables are bound
and the two hypotheses become one. In the end, the chills and pain are explained as a
poplffl_9yndrome(right_upper_quadrant)
r
pople9_syndroireG0 \
chills pain®)
II II
cliills pain®')
/
InflammationCP) ^ 1 ^presenKP^) | pres€nt(F '^) located_in(S'®')
^
II
mflainimtion(abscess) located_in(liver,right_upper_quadrant)
Figure 2: An Explanation for Pople's Liver Diagnosis Example
result of the presence of an inflammatory abscess in the liver.
Figure 2 shows the structure of the resulting explanation. The root nodes in the forest
of proof trees are the observed symptoms (in this case, pain in the right upper quadrant
and chills). The leaves are the hypotheses and facts that explain the symptoms by way of
general rules (in this case, an inflammatory abscess is present in the liver). Uniflcations
are represented as equalities in the figure. The information sharing due to merging is
indicated in the figure using arrows: the value of P propagates to the right while the vdue
of S' propagates to the left.
In the final step in the construction of the explanation, the abduction engine assumes
that an abscess is present in the liver in order to complete the explanation. This was not
given as part of the general background knowledge, nor was it provided as part of the
statement of the case. It is also not operational, in the sense that it is not easy to directly
observe whether an abscess is present in someone's liver.®
Using an abduction engine for the explanation component of an EBL system yields
several advantages with respect to learning. First, explanations are possible in situations
where proofs are not. This enables the system to leam in additional situations, using
traditional explanation-based macro-learning. Second, abduction is a form of knowledge
level learning. The hypotheses that are assumed as part of the process of completing
explanations provide new information that is useful in its own right.
In the liver example, the abduction engine generates and leams a hypothesis stating
that an abscess is present in the liver. This is a relatively specific assertion that bears on
®See Section 4.2 for further discussion of this point.
Table 4: A Macro Learned from Pople's Liver Diagnosis Example
poplessyndrome{R) •<— present{I, Si) Ainflammatory(I) A
present{P, S2) AlocatedJn{S2, R).
Table 5: A Special Case of the Learned Macro
poples-syndrome(R) <- inflammatory(P),present(P,S),locatedJn(S,R)
the case at hand but it is still important because it can be used to generate observable
predictions and to suggest treatments.
The macro learned in this example is shown in Table 4. This macro corresponds to the
enclosed part of the explanation structure in Figure 2. The macro results from ignoring
the details of the particular example.
Note that the two present predicates that were merged in the example arenot merged in
the learned macro. Merging at learning time would produce the relatively compact macro
shown in Table 5. However, merging at learning time is more dangerous than merging at
explanation time in the sense that it ismore hkely to lead to errors and contradictions (see
Section 3.3). This is because the literals in the condition of the macro are so general and
there are so many unbound variables. Many merge errors can be avoided by considering
merging only literals that were successfully merged intheexample. Butmerging at learning
time is ultimately unnecessary sincemergingwilloccur when the macro is used to construct
new explanations. The immerged macro is more general and contains the merged macro as
a special case. An advantage of learning the unmerged macro is that if merging specializes
it for a new example and a merge fails, it is still possible to retract the merge and use a
more general form of the macro.
3 Case Studies
We studied the integration of abduction and learning on numerous examples in the context
of diverse domains.. We chose domains that enabled us to study explanations involving
logical, physical, and psychological knowledge and reasoning. We chose domains relevant
to a wide range of tasks including:
• natural language understanding and plan recognition,
• qualitative physical reasoning and postdiction,
• diagnosis and signal interpretation, and
• decision-making under uncertainty.
In this section, we provide brief descriptions ofthecase studies. Each description shows
how to set up an abduction engine in a particular domain and how abduction can solve a
particular task in that domain. We show how to provide and how to represent the relevant
knowledge. We specify the operationality and eissumability criteria and the constraints
imposed on the search for explanations. We give an example and its explanation. We
describe what is learned by macro-learning and by abductive inference in each case study.
3.1 Case Study: Explaining Emotions
The domain in this case study is emotions. The task is postdiction. In this case, we
studied explanations of emotional states in terms of prior situations and events. This task
is relevant to natural language understanding and plan recognition (Dyer, 1983a; Dyer,
1983b).
We constructed a first order logical theory ofemotion elicitation containing rules cov
ering eliciting conditions of twenty emotion types (see Table 6). In addition, we coded
variants ofa number of them, details ofwhich have been omitted due to space constraints.
(See O'Rorke &Ortony, 1992 for a presentation of the full theory.) The theory draws upon
knowledge representation work onsituation calculus (McCarthy, 1968) and conceptual de
pendency (Schank, 1972). It includes axioms that support causal reasoning about actions
and other events that can lead to emotional reactions. For example, the first law below
mediates positive and negative effects ofactions. Thesecond law states that a precondition
of a physical transfer from one location to another is that one must first be at the initial
location. The remaining laws state the effects of a physical transfer.
holds{F, do{A, S)) <— causes{A, F, S) Aposs{A, S).
poss(ptrans{P, To, From, T),S)*- holds{at{T, From), S).
causes{ptrans{P,To, From, T), at{T, To), S)
causes(ptrans{P,To,From, T),at{T, From), S).
Emotion types are represented as fluents and their eliciting conditions are encoded in
rules. As examples, consider the rules for the emotion types fear and relief, shown in
Table 6. The fear rule captures the idea that people may experience fear if they want
an anticipated fluent not to hold. Relief may be experienced when the negation of a
feared fluent holds. Fear usually occurs before the fluent holds. Note that, although
manyexamples of fear involve expectations, we use the predicate anticipates in an effort to
suggest the notion of "entertaining the prospect of" a state of affairs. The purpose of this
10
Table 6: Elicitation Conditions for 20 Emotion Types
joy{P, F, S) ♦_ wants{P, F, S) Aholds{F,S).
distress(P, F, S) •wants{P, F, 5) Aholds{F, S).
happyJor{Pi ,Ps,F, S) <- joy{Pi,joy{P2, F, So),S).
sorTy.for{Pi,Ps,F, S) distress{Pi,distress{P2, F, Sq),S).
resenta{Pi, PgjF, S) distress{Pi,joy{P2, F, Sg),S).
gloats{Pi,P2,F,S) joy{Pi,distress{P2,F,So),S).
hopes {P, F, S) wants{P, F, S) Aanticipates{P, F, S).
fears{P, F, S) wants{P, F, S) Aanticipates{P, F, S).
3atisfied{P, F, S) ♦- precedes{So, S) Ahopes{P, F, Sq) Aholds{F, S).
fears.confirmed {P, F, S)
—
precedes{So, S) Afears{P, F, Sq) Aholds{F,S).
relieved{P, F, S) precedes(So, S) Afears{P, F, Sg) Aholds(F, S).
disappointed{P, F, S) precedes{So, S) Ahopes{P, F, Sg)Aholds(F, S).
proud{P, A, S) agent{A, P) Aholds{did{A), S) Apraiseworthy(A).
self.reproach{P, A,S) agent{A, P) Aholds{did{A), S) Ablameworthy{A).
admire{Pi ,P2, A,S) agent{A, P2) holds{did{A), S) Apraiseworthy{A).
reproach{Pi,P2,A, S) <- agent{A, Pg) Aholds{did{A), S) Ablameworthy{A).
grateful{Pj, P2, A,Sj) agent{A, P2) Aholds(did{A), Si) /\precedes{So,Si) A
cause3{A, F, Sg)Apraiseworthy^A) Awants{Pi ,F,Si) Aholds{F, Si).
angry.ai{Pi ,P2,A,Si) i agent{A, Fg) Aholds{did{A), Si) Aprecedes{So,Si)A
causes{A,F,Sg)Ablameworthy(A) Awants{Pi^'F,Si) Aholds{F,Si).
gratified{P, A, Sj) agent{A,P2) Aholds{did{A), Si) ApTecedes{So,Si) A
causes{A, F,Sg) Awants{P, F,Si)A holds{F, Si) Apraiseworthy(A).
remorseful{P, A, Si) 4— agent(A, P2) Aholds{did{A), Si) Aprecedes{So, Si) A
causes(A, F,Sg) Awants(P,F,Si) Aholds{F, Si) Ablameworthy{A).
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is to avoid suggesting that hoped-for and feared events necessarily have a high subjective
probabihty.
The operationality criterion in this domain enables efficient recognition of predicates
such as the following.
diff(X,Y).
member(X, Y).
opposite(X, Y).
action(X).
precondition(A, C).
agent(A,P).
precedes(Sl,S2).
cognitive-unit(P, Q).
dJikes(P,Q).
Some of these predicates are relatively domain independent and they will be seen in other
case studies. Others are relatively domain-dependent. The predicate diff, which ensures
that two terms are not identically equal, is needed in representing knowledge about many
domains. The predicate action is useful in domains that involve agents and their actions.
This predicate checks whether its argument is an action. It is operational since no ex
planatory reasoning is involved. The predicates cognitive-unit and dJikes are relatively
domain dependent. The dispositional attitude dJikes is operational because it is assumed
that likes and dislikes are not explainable. In addition to these predicates, simple goals
present in the database as facts are also considered to be operational.
All conjectures in this domain are assumable except meta-predicates like diffand in
stances of the following:
preconditions{A, F).
causes{A,F,S).
In other words, the abduction engine is not allowed to assume that an arbitrary fluent
might be a precondition for an action, nor is it allowed to assume improvable cause-effect
relationships between actions and fluents. In early experiments without these constraints
we found that the abduction engine conjectured large numbers of implausible causal re
lationships. We impose these constraints because, in this domain, many explanations of
given observations are possible. It is important to constrain the search to avoid large
numbers of implausible hypotheses and explanations.
We use an example to illustrate the abductive construction of explanations for emotions.
The example is based on data taken from a diary study ofemotions CRimer, 1985). Most
of the subjects who participated in the study were sophomores at the University of Illinois
at Champaign-Urbana. They were asked to describe emotional experiences that occurred
12
Table 7: Explanations for Relief and Fear
Case Facts
wants(mary, sleep(mary), _)
Query
why(relieved(mary, not at(tc, home(mary)), s2))
Explanation
relieved(mary, not at(tc, home(mary)), s2)
precedes(sl, s2)
fears(mary, at(tc, home(mary)), si)
wants(mary, not at(tc, home(mary)), si)
anticipates(mary, at(tc, home(mary))j si)
hol(ls(not at(tc, home(mary)), s2)
causes(ptrans(tc, .29887, home(niary), to), not at(tc, home(mary)), si)
pci6s(ptrans(tc, J29887, home(mary), to), si)
holds(at(tc, home(mary)), si)
not causes(ptrans(karen, home(mary)), not at(tc, home(mary)),
holds(at(tc, home(mary)), sO)
poss(ptrans(karen, home(mary)), sO)
Abbreviations
sl=do(ptrans(karen, home(mary)), sO)
s2=do(ptrans(tc, .591, home(mary), to), si)
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within the previous 24 hours. They typed answers to a computerized questionnaire con
taining questions about which emotion they felt, the event giving rise to the emotion, the
people involved, the goals affected, and so on. Over 1000 descriptions of emotion episodes
were collected, compiled, and recorded on magnetic media. We have encoded over 100 of
these examples using our situation calculus representation language. The following case
provides examples of relief and fear.
Mary wanted to go to sleep.
Karen returned.
T.C. finally left her place.
Mary was relieved.
The case is encoded as shown in Table 7. The case fact says that Mary wants sleep. The
query asks why Mary is relieved that T.C. is not at her home in the situation that results
after T.C.'s departure. T.C.'s departure occurred in the situation resulting from Karen's
return. (Note the abbreviations for relevant situations at the bottom of the Table.)
The explanation shown in Table 7 was constructed automatically by AMAL by back
ward chaining on observations to be explained. AMAL tries to reduce the observation to
known facts by invoking general laws (e.g., causal laws of situation calculus and laws of
emotion elicitation). In this case, the eliciting condition for relief is invoked in order to
explain Mary's relief. This generates new questions that must be answered, and so on.
The resulting explanation (shown in Table 7) states that Mary is relieved that T.C. is no
longer at her home. The explanation assumes that Mary fears T.C.'s presence in her home
because she wants T.C. not to be in her home but she anticipates that he will be there.
The following macro is learned from the example.^
relieved{Pi,P, do(ptrans{P2, T,F, O),Si)) *—
precedes{So, do(ptrans{P2,T, F, O), Si))A
wants{Pi, P, So) Aanticipates{Pi, P, So)A
causes(ptrans{P2,T, F, 0),P, Si) Aholds{at{0, P),Si).
A gloss of the macro is: a person may experience relief that a fluent does not hold in the
situation resulting from a physical transfer if the person desired the fluent not to hold in
an earher situation but anticipated it holding and the move causes the fluent not to hold.
The macro bypasses ^e intermediate emotion type fears, going directly to the eliciting
conditions wants{Pi,P,So) and anticipates{Pi, P,Sq). The condition that the negative
fluent holds is also elaborated. It is replaced by a precondition of the action that causes
the negative fluent to hold. This macro is quite general as compared to the given case. In
'^ Various macros with more or less generality can be learned here. The macro shown is derived by
excising an instance of a negative frame axiom that established the preconditions for the ptmns in the
example. A still more genertd macro can be learned, by replacing the ptmns with an arbitrary action.
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addition to eliminating the specific agents involved, the macro does not require the desired
negative fluent to be a direct effect of the ptrans, although in the specific example this was
the case since Mary desired T.C. to be absent and his leaving had this effect.
An interesting general class of macros is learned in this domain if the eliciting condi
tions of the compound emotions anger, gratification, and remorse are initially
expressed in terms of their components. These emotion types are compounds of well-being
and attribution emotion types. The compounds are formed by crossing the reactions to
events and states {pride and distress) with the reactions to agent's actions {admiration, re
proach, pride, shame). The eliciting conditions of the compound emotions shown in Table 6
were constructed by combining the eliciting conditions of the components, simplifying by
eliminating redundant conditions. This approach was taken to avoid suggesting that the
components are necessarily elicited whenever a compound emotion is elicited. But if the
ehciting conditions of compounds such as angry.at are initially expressed in terms of their
components, macro-learning "compiles out" the component emotions, so that compounds
are explainedand recognized directly in terms of the eliciting conditions of the components
rather than indirectly through the component emotion types. It is interesting to speculate
whether this sort of chunking occurs in human reasoning about emotions.
Another general class of macros correspondingto frame axioms is learned in this domain
when explanations of effects of actions are demanded and when learning from subgoals is
allowed. This corresponds to Kowalski's (1979) observation that early versions of frame
axioms that were specific to individual actions can be had by forming macros from very
general frame axioms plus specific statements about effects of actions.
Merging in this domain occurs primarily in the ehciting conditions of the compound
emotions. Angry.at, forexample, combines the eliciting conditions of distress and reproach.
The holds conditions in the eliciting conditions for angry^at are identified when a person is
angry-at another because the other is assumed to have done a blameworthy action that the
person did not want done. When the holds conditions are not identical, they are effects of
hypothetical causes that are identified. This is the case when a person is angry-at another
because of an impleasant effect of a blameworthy action presumed executed by the other.
More merging occurs if the eliciting conditions of compounds such as angry-at are expressed
in terms of their components since many redundant conditions were eliminated by hand
in constructing the eliciting conditions of the compound emotions shown in Table 6. In
the alternative approach, these hand-merged conditions would be merged automatically at
explanation time.
Assumptions are required in the majority of the cases based on the diary study data
just as they were needed in the example of relief and fear. The kinds of assumptions
needed include missing preconditions, goals, prospects, and judgements. In the example,
the assinnption that T.C. was at Mary's home in the initial situation helps explain the
fact that he was there after Karen came home. This in turn is a precondition for T.C.'s
leaving Mary's home. The example also requires an assumption that Mary wanted T.C. to
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be elsewhere inorder toexplain Mary's fear that T.C. would be at her home. Assumptions
about others' goals occur frequently, especially in explaining emotions that involve the
"fortunes of others." Abductive assumptions about other mental states include assump
tions about whether agents anticipate events. In the example of relief, it was assumed
that Mary anticipated T.C.'s continued (unwelcome) presence in her home. Assumptions
about judgements of blame worthiness and praise worthiness are important in explaining
a number of emotions not present in the example.
Operational predicates are assumable in this domain. For example, ordinarily dispo-
sitional liking is determined by looking up facts of the form (Llikes(John,Mary) in the
database in order to determine whether John likes Mary. But if no such fact is present,
instead of faihng the query, the query may be assumed if necessary in order to complete
the explanation. In one example in the case study, this is done in order to explain why
John is angry at someone who insulted Mary.
3.2 Case Study: Explaining Physical Processes
The domain in this case study is a qualitative process theory (Forbus, 1984) of chemical
reactions. We used this domain to study dramatic changes in systems of beliefs such
as occur in scientific revolutions. We investigated a general approach to theory revision
using abduction for theory formation. The approach is based on the view that, when an
anomaly is encountered, explanations of the anomaly can leadto new hypotheses that can
form crucial parts of a revised theory. We studied this approach using examples based on
events that occurred during the Chemical Revolution (Conant, 1957; Guerlac, 1961; Ihde,
1980). In earlier work, Thagard (1988; 1989) showed how one can choose between the
phlogiston and oxygen theories, assuming that both theories are available to choose from.
We extended earlier work byinvestigating abductive approaches to generating theories such
as the oxygen theory. The specific task in this context was postdiction, the explanation of
an observation in terms of previous events.
We constructed a physical domain theory based on qualitative process theory (Forbus,
1984). Our logical interpretation of QP theory included the laws shown in Table 8. The
first law, GLi, states that active processes directly infiuence quantities, driving them up or
down. The laws GL^a and GLzb cover indirect influences mediated by qualitative propor
tionality. The first law of this pair, GL20, states that a quantity may increase or decrease
if it is positively qualitatively proportional to another quantity and the other quantity
increases or decreases, respectively. The second law of this pair states that a quantity
may increase or decrease if it is negatively qualitatively proportional to another quan
tity and the other quantity decreases or increases, respectively. In other words, positive
qualitative proportionalities transmit the signs of changes in proportional quantities while
negative proportionalities invert the signs of changes. The law GL3 establishes qualitative
proportionalities between sums and their addends.
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Table 8: Laws of Qualitative Process Theory
GLi : derwjsign{Qi, Sign) *— process{Process) Aactive{Process)A
influence{Process,Qi,Sign).
GL2a • deriv-sign{Qi, Sign) *— qprop{Qi, Q^tpos) Aderiv^ign{Q2, Sign).
GL2b: derivjsign{Q\, Sign\) qprop{Q\,Q2,neg) Aderivjsign{Q2, Sign2)A
opposite{Signi,Sign2).
GLs : qpropiQ,Qupos) ^ qtyjeq(Q, qty-sum{Qs)) Amember{Qu Qs).
Table 9: A Qualitative Theory of Combustion and Calcination
qprop{weight{P), amount(P), pas).
process{combusticn).
influence{cornbusti(m,amounLofJn{phlogiston, charcoal), neg).
process{calcination).
influence{calcination,amounLof-in(phlogiston, mercuriusjcalcinatus), neg).
qtyjeq{amount{C),qtyjsum{Qs)) ^ complex{C)A
amountS-of-components-of{Qs, [C\,C2\Cs\, C).
amounts-of-component3-oJ{[amount-ofJn{Ci, C)A amounLof-in{C2> C) \As],
[Cx,C2\Cs\,C)
*— component{Ci,C) Acomponent{C2, C)A diff{Ci, C2)A
components{Gs,C)A amounts-of.components-of{As,Gs,C).
amounts-of.components-oJ{As, Cs, C): -components{Cs, C)A
setof{amounLof-in{Gi, C), component{Ci, C), As).
components(Cs,C): —setof(Ci, component{Ci,C),Cs).
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We provided a theory of combustion and calcination reflecting the phlogiston theory
(see Table 9). The theory is intended to capture the following qualitative chemical ideas:
• The weight of an object is qualitatively proportional to the amount.
• Combustion is a negative mfluence on the amount ofphlogiston in charcoal.
• Calcination is a negative influence on the phlogiston in merciuius calcinatus.
• The amount ofa complex substanceequals the sumof the amounts of the components.
The operationality criterion in this domain enables efficient recognition of predicates
such as the following.
diff(x,y)-
member(X,Y).
setof(X, Y,Z).
opposite(X,Y).
components(Cs,C).
amounts-of-components-of(As,Cs,C).
In addition, simple goals present in the database as facts are considered to be operational.
In this domain, the system is instructed to reject assumptions of the following form:
active(P).
In otherwords, the system isnot allowed to assume that processes are active. All other hy
potheses are subject to the approval or disapproval ofthe user. In general, additionalsearch
control is required in this domain; depth first search tends to get stuck generating useless
branches that happen to occur early in the search. In a related study (O'Rorke, Morris, &
Schulenburg, 1990), we used a heuristic measure of the quality of partial explanations and
conducted a best-first search. The measurewas similar to that used in weighted abduction
(Stickel, 1988); it favored explanations that groimded out more queries in case facts. But
we found it useful to introduce an additional penalty to discourage the introduction of
unnecessary individuals (Skolem constants).
Given the anomalous observation that the weight of mercurius calcinatus increases dur
ing calcination, AMAL constructs the explanation shownin Table 10.® The explanation is
interpreted: the weight of mercurius calcinatus increases because it is qualitativelypropor
tional to the amount. This in turn increases because it is proportional to the amount of its
components since it is a complex substance and the amount of a component is increasing.
The component is increasing in amount because a process, namely calcination, is actively
driving the amount of the component up.
®The explanation shown isgenerated byAMAL using a depth bound that prevents runaway depth first
seardi.
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Table 10: Explanation of an Increase in the Weight of Mercurius Calcinatus
Case Facts
active(calcination)
Query
why(deriv-sign(weight(mc), pos))
Explanation
deriv_sign(weight(me), pos)
qprop(weight(mc), amount(mc), pos)
deriv_sign(amount(mc), pos)
qprop(amount(mc), amount_of_in(_49, mc), pos)
qty-eq(amount(mc), qty_sum(amounts))
complex(mc)
amoiints-of-componentsjof(amounts, [_49, _51| _53], mc)
component(_49, mc)
component(_51, mc)
diff(_49, _51)
components(_53, mc)
amounts_of_components_of(_52, _53, mc)
member(amount_ofJn(_49, mc), amounts)
derivjsign(amountjofJn(_49, mc), pos)
process(calcination)
active(calcination)
influence(calcination, amount_of_in(_49, mc), pos)
Abbreviations
mc=mercuriusjcalcinatus
amoimts=[amountjofJn(_49, mc), amountjofJn(_51, mc)|_52)
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Table 11: Macro Learned in the Case of Mercurius Calcinatus
derivsign{X,S) <— qprop{X, amount{C),pos) f\
complex{C) Acomponent{Ci, C) A
component{C2, C) Adiff{Ci,C2) Acomp(ments{Cs, C) A
amounts^ofjoomponentsjof{As, Cs, C)
member{A, [amountjofJn{Ci,C),amountjof-in(C2,C) \As])
process{P) Aactive(P) Ainfluence{P, A, S).
AMAL proposes several explanations prior to the one shown in Table 10. The first
explanation proposed is that calcination directly influences the weight of mercurius calci
natus, driving it up directly. The second explanationproposed is that calcinationinfluences
the amoimt ofmercurius calcinatus, driving it up and thus indirectly driving the weight up.
These explanations are more or less compatible with the explanation shown in Table 10.
We reject them not because they are false, but because we desire a more specific explana
tion taking into account the fact that a calx is a complex substance. For a discussion of
this sort ofpreference for more specific explanations, see (Poole, 1985).
Macro learning in the example produces the results shown in Table 11. The macro
is interpreted to mean that a quantity may change if it is qualitatively proportional to
the amount of a complex substance and a process is actively infiuencing the amount ofa
component of that substance. This macro is more general than the example; it does not
specify whether the change is an increase or decrease and it does not specify names ofthe
complex substance or the specific components.
Merging occurs infrequently in the examples studied in this domain. When it does
occiu:, it is sometimes spurious. Forexample, merging can collapse components associated
with complex substances. The requirement that the components be distinct (expressed
using the predicate) then causes backtracking that undoes such mprging
Assmnptions are necessary in the explanation of the observation shown in Table 10.
The explanation rests in part on facts of the case at hand, such as the fact that calcination
occurred, and in part on general facts, such as the proportionality between weights and
amounts ofphysical substances. But the given facts are not sufficient to construct anexpla
nation of the observation. The explanation requires several hypotheses (shown in boxes).
The hypotheses are that mercurius calcinatus is a complex substance and calcination influ
ences the amount of a component of this substance, causing it to increase. The unknown
component is a hypothetical object (a Skolem constant) invented as a natural consequence
of the explanation process. This unknown substance corresponds to the theoretical entity
"oxygen" invented by Lavoisier. The hypotheses associated with it correspond to crucial
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parts of the oxygen theory of combustion.
Lavoisier's hypothesis that something was added by calcination to calx of mercury, in
conjunction with experimental results of Priestley and others, eventually led him to posit
the existence of a hitherto unknown component of air. During a period of over a decade,
Lavoisier and his colleagues worked out a new theory of combustion, calcination, and
respiration that eventually displaced the phlogiston theory. This occurred because most
chemists of the time were persuaded that the new theory explained the new observations
(and re-explained old observations) in a more coherent manner than did modified versions
of the phlogiston theory.®
3.3 Case Study: Explaining Decisions
The task in this case study is decision-making in situations involving uncertainty and
outcomes of differing utility. Such decisions typically involve trade-offs betweenconflicting
goals. This task is both ubiquitous and general; decision-making plays an important role in
many tasks such as plan recognition and it specializes to tasks such as diagnostic decision-
making.
In this abstract domain, we provide background knowledge in the form of a qualitative
logic of decision (O'Rorke & El Fattah, 1991). This is a first order logical theory with
three main components: a decision theory, a theory "of arithmetic inequalities, and an
operationality criterion.
The decision theory specifies when actions are reasonable. Given that op is an action
under consideration, assume that P is a predicate such that the odds of P being true is
odds. Assume that (5i is the difference between the utilityof the outcome of doing opwhen
P is true minus the utility of the alternative to doing op when P is true and that 62 is
the difference in utilities in case P is false. The following rule is an example of the sort of
decision theory provided.
should{6i,62,odds) ♦- 62 > —odds x 61.
This rule simply states an instance of the Bayesian view that one should prefer to do an
action of maximum expected utility.
Knowledge of arithmetic inequalities enables the system to reason about constraints on
quantities. Some of the more important rules provided about arithmetic inequalities are
shown in Table12. Theserulesprovide information about arithmetic inequalities including
the fact that inequalities are transitive, multiplication by non-negative numbers does not
alter the direction of an inequality, and so on.
®We have not attempted to model the overthrow of the phlogiston theory, or the argumentation or the
social processes involved. We do not claim to have automated all of the reasoning involved in the chemical
revolution.
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Table 12: Some Rules of Real Arithmetic
T1 : X> Z ^ X >Y AY >Z
T2 : X > Z X >Y ay > Z
MP: AxX>AxY^X>YaA>0
MN: AxX>AxYi-X>YAA>0
The operationality criterion is not just a list of operational predicates in this domain.
Operationality requires explanations to be based upon direct comparisons ofrelevant quan
tities. Only comparisons between utilities and odds and qualitative landmarks are allowed.
The admissible landmarks for odds are 0 and 1. The admissible landmark for utilities is
0. The utilities and odds introduced in a problem are also considered to be (problem spe
cific) landmarks. They are admissible whether they are numeric or symbolic (variables).
The negatives of all these quantities axe also allowed. The use of inequalities and the
representational bias provided by thisoperationality criterion contribute to the qualitative
character of the logic of decision.
Search is controlled in this domain in part by testing new queries such as ground
inequalities in order to verify their truth before trying to explain them. For example, upon
generating new queries such as 5^(20,1) or gt{0,1), the system verifies the first and rejects
the second goal by calling PROLOG using the built-in predicate >. Considerable effort is
saved by avoiding attempts to explain false statements.
Assmnability is determined by the user. Examples fall into two classes. One class
involves numeric values for all parameters and no assumptions. The second class involves
unknown values and assumptions. The following is an example where assumptions provide
valuable information.
Given a concretedecision problem specified as a query about whether it makes sense to
do a given operationunder given conditions, AMAL attempts to construct a proofthat the
action should be taken in the given situation. AMAL generalizes the particular decision
problem by specializing the general decision theory and theory of arithmetic. Irrelevant
details of the case are discarded. The underlying abstract explanation can be used to
justify the current decision and to decide similar cases in the future.
Consider the following example. The B-IB strategic bomber is maintained using an
on-board Central Integrated Test System (CITS). A ground-based expert system called
the CITS Expert Parameter System (CEPS) was developed by Rockwell International
Corporation and Boeing Military Airplane Company. This diagnostic expert system was
constructed using standard knowledge-engineering tedmiques. The following quote is from
a report on CEPS (Davis, 1986).
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operation bad gate bad servo expected utility
check gate
replace servo
-Ixp -(1 + 12) X (1-p)
-(12 + l) xp -12 X(1-p)
12 xp - 13
-12-p
The resolution of this ambiguity was determined by interviewing maintenance
experts. CITS flags a failure in the Stability Control Augmentation System
involving a bad servo assembly. This error code indicates an 8 to 16 hourjob to
replace the servo. However, experienced technicians have noted that sometimes
the failure is actually caused by a faulty test gate that can be easily checked by
a Ground Readiness Test and replaced in less than one hour. CEPS uses this
expertise when it encounters this CITS Maintenance Code by instructing the
technician on the appropriate test to run, and the results that he should expect.
Evidently, experienced technicians prefer to first test a gateindicating that a servo assembly
is bad instead of replacing the servo assembly first. A simplified description of the situation
is shown in Table 13.
Assuming that just one ofthe possible explanations ofthe fault indication is correct, the
table shows two columns —one corresponds to a faulty test gateand the other corresponds
to a bad servo assembly. The rows of the table correspond to two action sequences; one
sequence starts with a test of the gate and the other simply starts by replacing the servo
assembly. We assume that the probability that the test light is bad is p and that the
probability that the servo assembly is bad is 1 - p. Measuring costs (negative utilities) in
hours and averaging the estimated 8-16 hours yields a -12 hour cost for replacing the servo
assembly. We charge -1 hour for testing and optionally replacing the test gate.
If a bad gate gives rise to the indication of a fault (an event with probability p), then
checking and replacing the gate will solve the problem at a cost of one hour. If the servo
is actually bad (the probability of this is 1 - p), then we will have to replace it, too, at an
additional cost of 12 hours (for a total cost of-l-12 = -13). The weighted average of
the costs if we check the gate first is thus 12 x p —13.
If the servo is replaced without checking the gate first, then assuming that the gate a
bad and that it continues to indicate a faulty servo, we still have to replace the gate at a
total cost averaging 13 hours. If the servo was actuallybad as indicated, then we only lose
an average of 12 hours. The weighted average of these costs is —12 —p hours.
In terms of gains, losses, and odds, = 12, 62 = —1, and odds is unknown in this
example. The important point is that checking the test lamp first results in a substantial
savings (an average of 12 hours) when the lamp is at fault. The time lost when the servo
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Table 14: Explanation of the Expert's Recommended Action
Query
why(should(12, -1, Odds))
Explanation
shou]d(12, -1, Odds)
gt(Odds*12, 1)
gt(Odds*12, 12)
gt(12, 0)
gt(Odds, 1)
gt(12, 1)
is actually at fault is relatively small. So the correct decision is relatively insensitive to the
exact quantities involved.
AMAL generates the explanation of the expert's recommendation shown in Table 14.
The explanation is constructed assuming that the expert is rational (using the rules shown
in Table 12). In particular, it uses transitivity ofinequality and the fact that multiplying
a positive number by a number greater than 1 magnifies the positive number.
The explanation requires an assumption about the expert's assessment of the odds of
the lamp being the source of the problem. To be specific, the explanation includes the
hypothesis that odds > 1.
Macro learning yields the following rule:
should{gain, loss,odds) <— gain > 0 Aodds > 1 Again > -loss.
This rule may be glossed: the operation should be done if the potential gain is greater
than the potential loss and the odds of success are better than even. This is considerably
more general than the example, which involved specific costs and utilities of outcomes.
The rule learned from this particular decision is useful in justifying the decision in more
general terms. It may also be applied to future examples, even if theyare not fully specified
because the exact values of some of the relevant probabilities or utiUties are untoown.
Merging is especially hazardous in this domain. A small number of predicates occur
very frequently, so their arguments —unrestricted variables corresponding to real numbers
— tend to be identified relatively arbitrarily. This leads to explanations and macros that
are inconsistent or excessively specific. This domain motivated the absence of merging in
the present macro-learning method (see Section 2.2).
Abductive hypothesis formation generates conjectures about subjective assessments of
likelihood in this domain (as in the example). In addition, it generates hypotheses about
expert's preferences and constraints on utilities of outcomes.
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Figure 3: An NDE Test and the Resulting Signal
3.4 Case Study: Explaining Signals
The task in this case study was diagnostic signal interpretation. In particular, we stud
ied this task in the domain of non-destructive evaluation (NDE). The goal of NDE is to
determine whether parts are "good" or "defective" without damaging the parts. Piezo
electric probes are used to produce ultrasonic signals that indicate the existence of cracks
and other defects inside solid materials. We use knowledge-intensive explanatory reason
ing to construct interpretations of NDE signals, simultaneously classifying materials under
evaluation.
We provide knowledge about the classes of interest, knowledge about the geometry of
the parts to be tested, and knowledge about the physics of ultrasonic signal propagation.
In a study involving a standard set of almninum test blocks, there are two classes, normal
and cracked. We provide the system with rules like the following.
peaks{S, 3) <— signal{S,B) Acracked{B) A
feature{peak{S, 1)) Areflection(peak{S, 1),S,front(B),B) A
Jeature{jpeak{S, 2)) Acrack{C, B) Areflection{peak(S, 2), S,C,B)) A
feature(j)eak{S,3)) Areflection{jpeak{S,3), S,back(Block),B).
This rule can be glossed: the signal from a block will have three significant peaks if the
block is cracked and the first peak is a refiection from the front, there is a craxik in the
block and the second peak is a refiection from the crack, and the third peak is a refiection
from the back end.
The geometrical knowledge is restricted to one dimension: we specify the depths of
known features for each of the test blocks. Knowledge of the physics of ultrasonic signals
included the following rules for determining when a peak in a signal corresponds to a
reflection of a feature in the material and for computing the depth of a feature from the
arrival time of the reflection from the feature.
reflection{peak{S, N),S,Fb,B) signal{S, B)AfeatuTe{peak{S, N)) Afeature{FB) A
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depthc(peak{S,N), Ds) Adepthi{FB, Dg) A
requal{Ds, Db).
depthc{P, D) : - ptime{P, T)AD = 0.00499 xT- 0.0902
Operational predicates included predicates for determining whether two numbers were
sufficiently close to be "roughly equal" {requal), predicates for looking up the depths of
known features (depthi), and for computing the expected depths of features from signal
reflection times (depthc).
In this domain, everything is assumable subject to user approval. The user is expected
to be a knowledgeable NDE technician. The system is intended to advise and not to
replace the user. The abduction system is intended to be used to generate conjectures and
to propose them to a human expert for ratification.
Given ultrasonic test signals, wenm a preprocessor to generate qualitative abstractions
of the signals specifying the times and sizes of important features such as peaks (Morris,
1992). We give AMAL queries such as "cracked(blockSS)?' and it produces explanations
supporting such conclusions.
The explanation shown in Table 15 isgenerated for a testsignal taken from a particular
block. Given a qualitative description ofa signal such as theone shown in figure 3, AMAL
produces an explanation that identifies the first and last spikes in the signal as reflections
from the fi-ont and back surfaces ofthe block. The explanation has subexplanations inter
preting each major feature of the signal. The assumptions in boxes assert the existence of
a hypothetical crack in the block at a depth roughly equal to a half inch.
Macro learning produces the rule shown in Table 16 on the given example. The rule
explains three peaks in a signal taken from a block in terms of correspondences between
features ofthesignal and theblock. The rule drops intermediate concepts such as reflection.
In addition, the macro construction process eliminates a number of duplicate signal and
feature conditions that appear in the conditions of the component rules.
Assumptions about the existence ofa crack are required in order to explain the anoma
lous peak in the signal given in the example. This involved theintroduction ofa hypothet
ical entity — a new feature of an existing object. In other examples, assumptions about
the existence ofechoes are required to explain anomalous spikes in signals. In general, ab-
ductive inference in this domain generates hypotheses about processes that might account
for known features of signals and hypotheses about new features ofexisting objects.
3.5 Summary of Case Studies
We have conducted case studiesinvolving over a hundred examples in four distinct domains.
We presented sketches of these case studies and examples. We gave examples of two types
oflearning: abductive inference and macro learning. Here we provide a brief smnmary and
review of the case studies prior to a discussion of the lessons learned.
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Table 15: Explanation of an Anomalous NDE Signal
Case Facts
signal(d35,blockSS).
feature(peak(d35,1)).
ptime(peak(d35,l),13.5).
amplitude(peak(d35,l), 115.26).
feature(peak(d35,2)).
ptime(p€ak(d35,2),116.5).
amplitude(peak(d35,2),14.33).
feature(peak(d35,3)).
ptime(peak(d35,3),273).
amplitude(peak(d35,3),18.93).
Query
why(peaks(d35, 3, bIock35))
Explanation
peaks(d35, 3, block35)
signal(d35, block35)
cracked(block35)
feature(peak(d35, 1))
reflection(peak(d35, 1), d35, front(block35), block35)
signal(d35, block35)
feature(peak(d35, 1))
feature(front(block35))
depth_c(peak(d35, 1), -0.022835)
depthJ(front(block35), -0.02533)
requal(-0.022835, -0.02533)
feature(peak(d35, 2))
crack(crack0(block35), block35)
reflection(peak(d35, 2), d35, crack0(block35), block35)
signal(d35, block35)
feature(peak(d35, 2))
feature(crack0(block35))
depth_c(peak(d35, 2), 0.491135)
depthJ(crackO(block35) -1831)
requal(0.491135, .1831)
feature(peak(d35, 3))
reflection(peak(d35, 3), d35, back(block35), block35)
signal(d35, blodc35)
feature(peak(d35, 3))
feature(badc(blodc35))
deptkjc(p€ak(d35, 3), 1.27207)
depthJ(back(bIock35), 1.25)
requal(1.27207, 1.25)
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Table 16: Macro Learned from the Interpretation of the NDE Signal
peaks{S, 3, B) <— signal{S, B) Acracked{B) A
feature(jpeak{S, 1)) Afeature{front{B)) A
depthu:(j}eak{S, 1), Dpi) AdepthJ{front{B), Dps) Arequal{Dpi, Dps)A
feature(peak(S, 2)) Acrack{C, B) Afeature{C) A
depth.c(j)eak{S, 2), Dpa) AdepthJ{C, Dc) Arequal{Dp2, Dc) A
feature(j}eak{S,3)) Afeature{back{B)) A
depth.c{peak{S, 3), Dpg) a depthJ{back{B), Dbb) Arequal{Dpa, Dbb).
In a study of explanations of emotions based on psychological research, we encoded
a theory of emotion eliciting conditions and generated explanations of emotional states.
The explanations involved hypotheses about missing preconditions, goals, prospects, and
judgements.
In a study of explanations of physical processes based on the history of science, we
investigated a possible role for abduction in large scale theory revision. We constructed a
knowledge base encoding qualitative process theory, knowledge about sums and lists, and
fragments of the phlogiston theory's view of combustion and calcination. Our abduction
system constructed explanations ofanomalous observations. These explanations contained
new hypotheses corresponding to crucial parts of Lavoisier's oxygen theory of combustion
and calcination.
In a study of explanations of decisions, we constructed a knowledge base encoding
aspects of Bayesian decision theory and some knowledge of arithmetic and we generated
explanations of experts actions in uncertain situations involving goals of differing pri
ority. The assumptions required to complete these explanations correspond to experts'
preferences and subjective assessments of probabilities.
In a study of explanations of signals, we represented knowledge about the geometry
of parts under nondestructive evaluation and knowledge of ultrasonic signal propagation.
Qualitative descriptions ofanalog NDE signals are explained in terms ofthis given knowl
edge. Hypotheses about defects in the parts explain anomalous peaks in the signals. Inter
estingly, the separation of observations into expectations and anomalies is done during the
explanation process. The process is a form of "layered abduction" (Josephson, 1989) inthe
sense that the system builds up an interpretation ofthe overall signal from interpretations
of features in the signal. The task requires the use of predicates with some tolerance since
continuous real valued numeric measurements are involved.
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4 Discussion
In this section, we discuss the abductive macro learning method presented insection 2in the
light of the case studies presented in section 3. We compare abductive macro learning with
earlier explanation-based learning methods. We argue that abduction provides important
new capabilities. We discuss abductive hypothesis formation, assumability, operationality,
search control, and macro learning.
4.1 Abductive Hypothesis Formation
The learning method described here is closely related to earlier EBL methods (e.g., see
DeJong & Mooney 1986). In particular, the method is similar to the model of EBL pre
sented by Mitchell, Keller, and Kedar-Kabelli (1986). The implementation is comparable
to Kedar-Cabelh's and McCarty's PROLOG-EBG implementation of that model (Kedar-
Cabelli k McCarty, 1987). The methods are similar in that they share the same basic view
of explanation. They use proofs to represent explanations and they use backwardchaining
in constructing explanations. But the abductive model of the process of constructing ex
planations goes beyond deduction. When backward chaining fails, abduction is capable of
making assumptions that help complete the explanation. A PROLOG-EBG program will
fail to complete an explanation and will consequently fail to learn. By contrast, our method
identifies hypotheses that would accoimt for the observations, assumes them, and leaxns
from the resulting explanation. As a result, unlike traditional EBL systems, abductive
macro learners like AMAL are capable of learning at the knowledge level.
Numerous examples encountered in the case studies, including the examples chosen
for presentation in this paper, illustrate the distinction between traditional EBL and our
abductive extension. Given the same background knowledge and codifications of the cases
provided with the observations to be explained, a purely deductive PROLOG-style inter
preter will fail to find an explanation. The abductive inferences generated in these cases
contribute to explanations, and they are valuable in their own right.
In the emotion domain, abductive inference is needed to construct the explanation of
Mary's relief (Table 7) and many other explanations of emotion elicitation (see O'Rorke
k Ortony, 1992). In general, in the emotion domain, abductive hypothesis formation
generates inferences about the mental states (beliefs, desires, expectations, etc.) of the
individual experiencing an emotion and of the other agents involved.
Admittedly^ the emotion elicitation knowledge base could conceivably be extended so
that some assumptions could be eliminated and replaced by deductive inferences. For
example, if knowledge of ethics and standards of behavior could be provided, the num
ber of assumptions in explanations requiring judgements of blame worthiness and praise
worthiness could be reduced. But it is not likely that all relevant preconditions, desires,
prospects, and judgements can be provided in advance.
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In the domain inspired by the Chemical Revolution, abductive inference is needed to
explain observations like the fact that the weight ofmercurius calcinatus increases when it
burns. This fact is anomalous according to the phlogiston theory but it can be explained
in terms of more basic principles corresponding to qualitative process theory —provided
that some assumptions are made. The assumptions correspond to key insights arrived at
by Lavoisier when he realized that phlogiston did not leave combustibles as they burned,
instead something (hecoined the term "oxygen") combined with substances like mercurius
calcinatus thus increasing their weight.
In the Chemical Revolution domain, abduction generates hypotheses about whether
processes mfluence quantities; and hypotheses about complex substances and their com
ponents, and associated quantities such as amounts and weights. The hypotheses about
influences violate closed world assumptions normally made in qualitative process theory
(see section 3.6.3, "determining changes," in Forbus 1984). It is usually assumed that all
changes are caused directly or indirectly by processes, all processes are known, and all
direct and indirect influences are known. Quoting Forbus, "without these closed-world as-
siunptions, it ishard to see how a reasoning entity could use, much less debug or extend, its
physical knowledge." The closed-world assumptions guarantee efficient computation when
the qualitative physical situation is thoroughly understood. However, the case study of
the Chemical Revolution seems to indicate that this set ofclosed world assumptions is not
appropriate when radical belief revision is necessary. Using deduction under these closed
world assumptions, it is impossible to explain and learn from anomalous cases like the mer
curius calcinatus example. Abduction offers a way ofrelaxing theclosed-world assumptions
while using and extending the kind of physical kiiowledge expressed in qualitative process
theory.
In the domain of decision-making, abductive inference is needed in order to complete
explanations of decisions to prefer one action over another when numbers relevant to the
decisions axe not known. In the B-IB example, the costs and utilities associated with the
outcomes of test and replacement actions are available. The likelihoods of failure of the
parts are not available but constraints on these likelihoods are generated given that the
test operation is preferred to replacement. In general, abduction generates hypotheses that
include constraints on subjective assessments of likelihood and on relative desirabilities of
outcomes in this domain.
In the NDE domain, abductive inference generates hypotheses in an effort to explain
anomalous signals. Physical processes such as echoes are invoked to explain anomalous
features of signals. Hypothetical structural defects in the material under evaluation are
conjectured. Classifications ofmaterials as defective or non-defective are also conjectured.
In this domain, the hypotheses generated are extremely important with respect to the
immediate problem of classifying the material under evaluation.
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4.2 Assumability and Operationality
In the abductive approach to explanation-based learning presented in Section 2.1^ an "as
sumability" criterion plays an important role in learning. The assumabihty criterion is at
once similar and distinct from operationality.
In the model of EBL presented by Mitchell, Keller, and Kedar-KabelH (1986) the con
cept of operationality plays a crucial role. In that model, (quoting from page 52)
the task is to determine a generalization of the training example that is a suffi
cient concept definition for the goal concept and that satisfies the operationality
criterion. Note that the notion of operationality is crucialfor explanation-based
generalization: if the operationality criterion were not specified, the input con
cept definition could always be a correct output concept definition and there
would be nothing to leam! The operationality criterion imposes a requirement
that learned concept definitions must be not only correct, but also in a usable
form before learning is complete.
The traditional operationality criterion is a specification ofhowa definition of a concept
must be represented so that instances of the concept can be efficiently recognized. In many
examples, concepts are deemed to be operational when they are directly observable. In
the well known cup example adapted from Winston (1983), an explanation shows how the
functional characteristics of a cup result firom its structural characteristics. For example,
a cup can contain liquids and one can hold it and drink from it because it has a handle.
In this case, the operational definition of the cup is represented in terms of observable
features like the physical parts of the cup and their structural relationships.
Operationality is viewed as a specification of concepts that require no explanation in
the abductive macro learning method presented in Section 2.1. In the implementation,
operational queries are handled by the underlying PROLOG interpreter and no record
of any resulting backward chaining is retained in the explanation. In the case studies,
operationality is defined using predicate based specifications such as the following.
ddff(X,Y).
member(X, Y).
action(X).
precondition(A, C).
agent(A,P).
precedes(S1,S2).
cognitive-unit(P,Q).
<Llikes(P,Q).
These specifications differ with respect to their range of applicability. Some, like diffand
member, are domain independent; they occur in all the case studies. Others are some
what more specialized. The predicates action and precondition and agent are useful in
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domains that involve agents and their actions. Action is operational since no explanatory
reasoning is involved in determining whether something is an action. The predicates cog-
nitive-unit and d^likes are relatively domain dependent. The dispositional attitude dJikes
is operational because it is assumed that likes and dislikes are not explainable.
Operationality is also definable in terms that require computation such as backward
chaining and not just matching at explanation time. One example of this is the compu
tation that determines that simple goals present in the database as facts are operational.
Another example occurs in the case study ofexplanations of decisions. In that case study,
comparisons on operational terms axe considered to be operational. Operational terms are
defined in terms of general landmarks such as 0 and 1 and in terms of problem-specific
quantities like the odds ofan uncertain predicate. This case study indicates that purely
predicate-based specifications ofoperationality do not always suffice. In some cases, it is
also necessary to specify constraints on the arguments of the predicates, some of which
have to be evaluated at explanation time.
Assumability is like operationality in that both appear to be domain and task specific
— so in the statement of the method and in our implementation, a hook is provided to
enable assumability to be defined during the specification of each new domain. In some
cases, a given list of predicates is checked to decide whether to assume a hypothesis. This
approach es reasonable in situations (like NDE and diagnosis in general) where we know
in advance what kinds of hypotheses we are looking for. This approach can be made more
flexible by allowing computation to play a role in the decision about whether to make an
assumption. In some domains, a human user is employed as an oracle at explanation-time
and the decision is made interactively.
Assumability is unlike operationality in that they deal with different issues. One eval
uates the plausibility of hypotheses not known in advance to be true or false while the
other marks queries that can be efficiently evaluated and that do not require explanation.
Operational statements are usually not assumable and assumable statements may not be
operational in the usual sense. In the liver example, the hypothesis that there is an inflam
matory abscess in the patient's liver is not immediately verifiable by direct observation.
In fact, exploratory surgery would probably be required to conclusively confirm or discon-
firm this hypothesis by visual inspection. Similarly, in the NDE domain, it is not directly
observable or immediately verifiable whether a crack is present inside a solid metal part.
In fact, the point ofNDE is to use indirect inspection methods that avoid Hamaging parts
by directly observing for defects. In the emotion domain, hypotheses about mental states
occur frequently and these are even less directly observable.
4.3 Search Control
The abductive macro learning method presented in Section 2.1 employs two main kind«^ of
search control. Thefirst is a constraint ongoals generated during backward chaining, and
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the second is an additional constraint on goals that are being considered as hypotheses or
possible assumptions.
The most interesting constraint on goals encountered in the case studies occurs in the
study of decision-making. In this domain, many goals are tested using efficient computa
tions that determine their truth prior to attempting to explain them.
The most interesting constraint on conjectures occurs in the emotion and Chemical
Revolution domains. The following types of conjectures are disallowed:
preconditions{A,F).
causes{A,F,S).
active{P).
These constraints can be interpreted as assumptions. They are closed world assumptions
to the effect that all of the preconditions for all actions are known, all of the effects of all
actions are known, and all of the processes that are aotive are known.
If these closed world assumptions are made, large numbers of implausible hypotheses
and explanations are eliminated on the examples in the case studies. However, we think it
would be a mistake to generalize from this and claim that these types of conjectures should
alwaysbe disallowed. The constraints exhibit an asymmetry between actions and processes;
we required all the cause-effect relationships for actions to be known in the emotion study
but we allowed conjectmes about cause-effect relationships for processes in the chemical
revolution study. It seems likely that alternative examples or alternative representations
could be constructed that would require different constraints. For an example of a scenario
that could require different constraints consider the emotion domain. It may be necessary
to conjecture that a state is a previously unknown effect of an action taken by some
person in order to explain why a victim of the action is angry^t the agent given that
the effect elicits distress in the victim and reproach towards the agent. For an example
of an alternative representation that could require different constraints, consider the NDE
domain. We conjecture that if the NDE domain were formulated in terms of qualitative
process theory, some of the explanations of examples of signals would require hypotheses
to the effect that previously unknown processes (e.g., echoes) are active. We think it would
be a mistake to claim that there is a single search control or assumability criterion that
applies in all domains, tasks, representations, and examples.
4.4 Macro Learning
In this section we discuss the macros acquired in each case study. We discuss the macros'
content, compactness, generality, their usefulness as abstract explanations, and their po
tential for providing speedup.
In the emotion domain, macro learning constructs rules that elaborate general condi
tions eliciting emotions. The macro-rules specialize these general conditions while gen-
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eralizing observed examples. Two classes of macros of special significance occur in this
domain, one involving relationships between emotions and another involving the causes
and effects of actions. The first class of macros is formed when macro learning compiles
out the components of compound emotions such as angry^at (a compound of distress and
reproach) so that the compounds are recognized directly in terms of the eliciting conditions
of their components. The second class of macros is formed when macro learning acquires
frame axioms specialized to individual actions. Judging from the macros acquired in the
examples in this domain, it seems clear that they could benefit from methods for gener
alizing the structure of explanations. For example, in the case of relief a substantially
more general macro is obtained by generalizing the ptrans that occurs in the example to
an arbitrary action.
In the domain of qualitative processes, macro learning constructs rules that specialize
laws ofqualitative physics by tying them together with facts about complex substances, sets
of components, and so on. While the laws talk about general reasons why quantities change,
the learned macros talk about specific causes of change. In the example of mercurius
calcinatus, macro learning generates a rule explaining a change in a quantity qualitatively
proportional to the amount of a complex substance in terms ofa process actively changing
an amount of a component of that substance.
In the domain of NDE signal interpretation, macro learning constructs rules that rec
ognize high level features of signals using lower level features plus features of the material
under evaluation. Substantial merging occurs in macros constructed from NDE examples.
Although, in general, merging by unification is not allowed, elimination of duplicate (iden
tically equal) conditions is allowed and is beneficial. In the NDE example, this operation
eliminates six redundant signaland feature conditions.
In explaining decisions, macro learning constructs rules that recognize whether an ac
tion is rational using simple comparisons on parameters such as the relative utility of
an action and the odds of an unknown proposition's truth. Such rules may not provide
speedup in case all ofthe relevant numbers are known, since a simple calculation may be
used to determine the expected utility of an action in this case. The rules may, however,
provide speedup in situations where the precise values of the relevant nmnbers are not
known. In addition, they are useful as abstract explanations, even in cases where all the
numbers are known. Instead ofjustifying a decision in terms of an inequality involving
some calciilations, the rules provide a qualitative explanation that explains the specific
case as an instance ofa more general class ofcases where thesame action is obviously the
right thing to do. This is an example of a general phenomenon —abstract explanations
of concrete examples can transfer to subsequent problems even if they are incompletely
specified. Furthermore, abstract explanations are useful in their own right and ne^ not
always bejustified in terms ofperformance extensions orspeed upon subsequent problems.
At explanation time, they improve the comprehensibility of a classification or decision by
placing the example in a larger context.
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4.5 The Value of Learning
In this section, we discuss the relative value ofthe two different forms oflearning included in
abductive macrolearning. In this discussion, it is important to keep in mind that abductive
macro learning subsumes the traditional model ofexplanation-based learning presented in
Mitchell, et al (1986). If assumability is defined to be false so that nothing is assumable
then the implementation AMAL will behave exactly like PROLOG-EBG (Kedar-Cabelli
& McCarty, 1987). So abduction provides "added value" above and beyond the normal
capabilities of EBL.
We argue that the value added by abductive learning is at least as important for
explanation-based learning as the value of traditional deductive macro lemming by ap
pealing to the case studies. In several case studies, the majority of the examples require
abductive inferences in order to complete explanations. Macro-learning is heavily depen
dent on abductive learning in these case studies, in the sense that it is not possible in the
absence of abduction in these examples. In addition to facilitating macro-learning, which
then improves performance on future problems, abduction also contributes more directly
to the problem at hand. For example, in the NDE diagnosis domain, abductive inference
makes a direct contribution to the interpretation of anomalous signals and the classifica
tion of materials by generating assumptions about the physical structure of the materials
under evaluation. In addition to this direct contribution, abduction contributes indirectly
to NDE macro learning. Without abduction, macros would only be formed on normal
signals in this domain.
In a sense, comparing abduction with macro learning is like comparing apples and
oranges. They do different things. Deductive macro learning does not change the epistemic
state of the system; it is aimed at providing performance speedup on subsequent problems.
Abductive learning changes the epistemic state of the system. It provides new Imowledge
relevant to the problem at hand. It does not seem possible to argue that one type of
learning is more useful than the other in an absolute sense. Both types of learning are
clearly useful.
5 Related Work, Limitations, and Future Work
Since Peirce's time, a great deal of work has been done on explanations and abduction.
This work has taken place in fields such as philosophy (Harman, 1965; Thagard, 1981), and
psychology (Donaldson, 1986), and within Al in research areas suchas automated reasoning
(Reiter & de Kleer, 1987), diagnosis and expert systems (Josephson, Chandrasekaran,
Smith Jr., &: Tanner, 1987; Peng & Reggia, 1990; Pople, 1973) naive physics, and natural
language comprehension (Chamiak & McDermott, 1986; Schank, 1986). A collection of
articles focusing on recent Al research on abduction is available from the author (O'Rorke,
1990b).
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Recent reseaxch on the relationship between abduction and other forms of reasoning
(Console, Dupre, &Torasso, 1991; Konolige, 1992) shows that there is a close relationship
between abduction and an alternative consistency and minimization-based approach. It is
often possible to translate abduction into the alternative approach by rewriting a logical
theory adding "closure statements," for example, statements to the effect that the known
preconditions or causes are the only ones. While it may be worthwhile to add such closure
information to deal with special cases such as necessary preconditions, in general the ab-
ductive approach is superior because it does not require complete knowledge of causation,
and causal closures need not be computed and asserted.
For papers advocating the integration of abduction and explanation-based learning,
see (O'Rorke, 1988) and (O'Rorke, 1990a). A more complete account of the case study
of the chemical revolution is given in (O'Rorke, et al., 1990). More complete accounts of
the case study of emotion elicitation are given in (O'Rorke & Ortony, 1992a; O'Rorke &;
Ortony, 1992b). A fuller account of the acquisition of qualitative decision rules, is given
in (O'Rorke, Elliott, El Fattah, & Shu, 1992). That report examines collections of rules
acquired from sets of examples. It contains a comparison of rules acquired by AMAL vs.
similar rules acquired by the inductive learning program CN2. A more complete accoimt
of the abductive approach to NDE signal interpretation is given in (O'Rorke & Morris,
1992).
Related work onabduction andlearning byother authors includes the following. Falken-
hainer (1990) studies qualitative physical analogies and includes analogy in a process of
abductive hypothesis formation. Cohen (1992) provides a connectionist approach to learn
ing which rules to avoid applying in order to avoid erroneous explanations.
The major limitation of the mechanization ofabduction discussed here is with regard to
issues that arise when there are many competing explanations. How does one avoid a com
binatorial explosion of possibilities while searching for plausible explanations? How does
one weigh the evidence and decide that one explanation is more plausible than another?
In the abduction method described here, an "assumability" predicate is used to determine
which conjectures are acceptable. This approachis "allor nothing" in the sense that state
ments axe either assumable or not. An alternative approach involves scoring functions
that assign numeric "costs" to potential (partial) explanations. Stickel's heuristic method
for evaluating explanations (Stickel, 1988), while originally developed in the context of an
abductive approach to natural language processing (Hobbs, Stickel, Appelt, &: Martin, in
press; Stickel, 1989), can be used in other domains. We adopted this "weighted abduc
tion" method in one of our case studies. More recent probabilistic approaches (Chamiak
&: Shimony, 1990; Poole, 1991) promise to give us an even better handle on these issues.
We plan to pursue probabilistic abduction in future work.
36
6 Conclusion
Abductive inference is important for learning. The primary advantage of abductive infer
ence as opposed to deduction with respect to explanation-based learning is that it allows
the use of assumptions in order to complete explanations. These assumptions provide
useful new information, making it possible for EBL systems to learn at the knowledge
level.
We presented an explanation-based learning method that integrates abduction and
deductive macro-learning. The abduction component provides knowledge-level learning
while the deductive learning component provides performance speed up. The combination
is synergistic; abduction makes it possible to explain and learn macros from examples that
cannot be explained by a deductive explanation mechanism. The method is implemented
in a system called AMAL, which has been tested in case studies involving substantially
different domains.
We showed how knowledgerequired by the abduction engine, including various forms of
causal knowledge, is represented in diverse domains. Given a new domain and an abductive
task requiring working backwards from observed effects to underlying causes or reasons,
the general method can be apphed by
• determining an operationality criterion that marks statements that need not be ex
plained and by
• determining an assumability criterion that specifies which conjectures are allowable
as assumptions.
The case studies demonstrate that the abductive approach to explanation-based learning
provides a form of learning at the knowledge level that is useful in a wide variety of domains.
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